Saudi Arabia is assembling a multinational coalition to protect Red Sea shipping as Houthi attacks compound ongoing disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, pushing Saudi crude exports toward Red Sea routes. While Somalia has been included in this regional architecture, Somaliland—which actually governs Berbera and the adjoining Gulf of Aden coastline—has been omitted. Relying on Somalia's diplomatic signature creates a critical operational blind spot, as Mogadishu lacks the practical authority to grant port access, direct coastguard personnel, or enforce security in Somaliland-administered waters. To address this gap, Somaliland should pursue a pragmatic six-move strategy centered on direct maritime dialogue with Riyadh, associate/observer status, establishing a Berbera coordination cell, and enhancing local coastguard capabilities.
A maritime-security architecture cannot be credible if its diplomatic map excludes the authority governing one of the Gulf of Aden's most strategically valuable coastlines.
The situation, in brief Saudi Arabia is building a multinational coalition to protect Red Sea shipping after Houthi attacks compounded a separate crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, pushing more Saudi exports toward Red Sea routes that are themselves now under threat. Fourteen states have reportedly endorsed the initiative and representatives of 43 countries attended its founding discussions, but its command structure, rules of engagement and force contributions remain unannounced. Somalia has been included in this architecture. Somaliland — which actually governs Berbera and the adjoining Gulf of Aden coast — has not. That is the problem this briefing addresses. “No credible Gulf of Aden security architecture can be constructed without direct cooperation with the authority that governs Berbera and the Somaliland coast.”
The ask, in six moves — see full detail in the final section: Open a direct maritime-security dialogue with Riyadh, framed around practical cooperation rather than a maximalist membership demand Seek associate or observer status, or a seat on relevant technical working groups Offer a Berbera maritime coordination cell linking the coastguard, port authorities, DP World and coalition liaison officers Propose a transparent framework for naval visits, emergency access and force protection Invest visibly in coastguard capability so the offer is credible, not aspirational Coordinate informally with the UAE, given DP World's operational role in Berbera A coalition born from two chokepoints Saudi energy security has long rested on the ability to move crude from east to west via the East–West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, bypassing Hormuz entirely. That redundancy has become more important as the Hormuz disruption continues — but the alternative route depends on ships being able to clear the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb safely, and Houthi attacks have made that passage itself contested. Hormuz, Yanbu, Suez, Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden now function as a single interconnected theatre rather than separate regional problems. Saudi vessels have reportedly been rerouted north through Suez and around the Cape of Good Hope to reach Asian markets — adding roughly a month to some voyages. The coalition is meant to prevent armed actors from acquiring an effective veto over that export geography. The initiative's core strength is regional ownership. Earlier multinational responses have often been read as externally designed operations that regional states endorse politically while Western navies supply the operational weight. A Saudi-led structure could produce deeper Arab and Muslim buy-in and a sturdier political base for defending commercial navigation.
Reported supporters include Egypt, Türkiye, Pakistan, Djibouti, Somalia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Sudan, Bangladesh, Yemen and the Comoros — breadth that could give the mission legitimacy beyond a narrow Western coalition, though it says nothing yet about actual force generation. Some signatories have limited blue-water naval capacity, and others may sign politically while avoiding direct confrontation with the Houthis or Iran. Two absences stand out. The UAE — with major port-management experience and, through DP World, a direct commercial stake in Berbera — is not a member. Neither is Oman, which may simply prefer to preserve its independent diplomatic posture. Diplomatic breadth, in other words, is not yet operational capability.
CORRECTING THE RECORD — three figures worth checking before they harden into conventional wisdom Claim in circulation: The Red Sea carries “30 percent of global traffic.” Better figure: Before the recent disruptions, the Suez–Red Sea route carried roughly 10–15% of global maritime trade by volume; its share of global container trade was closer to 30%. The two measures are being conflated. Claim in circulation: 4.1 billion barrels transited Bab al-Mandeb in 2024. Better figure: The EIA figure is a daily flow, not an annual one: approximately 4.1 million barrels per day transited in 2024 — about half the 2023 level.
Claim in circulation: The Houthis “control” Yanbu.
Better figure: They can threaten vessels approaching or leaving Saudi Red Sea ports, which is serious maritime interdiction — but it is not physical or administrative control of the port itself.
These distinctions are placed here, early, deliberately: a briefing arguing for analytical rigor about Somaliland's exclusion should model that rigor before making its own case.
The Somaliland omission
Somaliland does not sit on the narrowest section of Bab al-Mandeb — Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen occupy the immediate strait, and Somaliland should not weaken its case by claiming geography it doesn't hold. Its relevance lies in the strategic depth east of the chokepoint: the Gulf of Aden is the maritime battlespace where vessels assemble, reroute, seek assistance and approach or depart the southern Red Sea, and Berbera sits directly along that corridor.
BERBERA — CURRENT AND PLANNED CAPACITY Current annual capacity ~500,000 TEU Planned second-phase capacity 2,000,000 TEU DP World committed investment Up to $442 million
Berbera can plausibly offer the coalition operational depth (port access, replenishment, crew rotation), maritime-domain awareness (coastal radar, AIS data, local reporting), search-and-rescue capacity, commercial resilience for diverted traffic, and geographical diversification away from a single-node dependency on Djibouti. None of this requires turning Berbera into an offensive platform — Somaliland's strongest offer is defensive maritime resilience, not militarisation.
The counterargument, and why it doesn't hold
A fair reading has to grant the other side of this. States routinely exclude non-recognized entities from founding coalition membership for reasons that have nothing to do with operational logic: deference to Somali sovereignty claims, African Union non-recognition norms, and a simple wish to avoid a diplomatic fight with Mogadishu before the coalition has even found its footing. Riyadh may judge that formally seating Somaliland is not worth the friction it would generate with Somalia and the AU, whatever the operational cost. That is a coherent political calculation, not a foolish one. But it is a calculation about optics, not about capability — and the two should not be allowed to merge. A coalition can decline to grant Somaliland a flag at the table while still doing the quiet, practical work of establishing who it calls when a tanker needs help off Berbera. The argument here is not that Riyadh must resolve the recognition question to proceed; it is that treating Somalia's signature as if it substitutes for Somaliland's operational cooperation is a category error that will surface at the worst possible moment — during an actual incident, not during a diplomatic reception.
Why Somalia's signature cannot substitute for Somaliland's consent
The coalition appears to follow the conventional diplomatic formula: Somalia is internationally recognized and therefore stands for the whole territory of the former Somali Republic. Maritime operations cannot run on that cartography alone. Berbera Port operates under agreements concluded directly between DP World and the Government of Somaliland, and international financial reporting on the port typically treats it separately from ports Somalia actually administers — reflecting the real institutional split between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Mogadishu cannot, in practice: authorise coalition access to Berbera; direct Somaliland coastguard or port personnel; establish operating procedures in Somaliland-administered waters; guarantee force protection for visiting coalition personnel; or compel Hargeisa to share maritime intelligence. A coalition vessel needing emergency access to Berbera will have to talk to Somaliland's authorities regardless of what the coalition's charter says. Establishing that channel now, transparently, is safer than improvising it mid-crisis. What the coalition still has to answer
Riyadh has not yet settled several basic questions, and Somaliland's case is stronger if it engages with them rather than assuming they're already resolved:
What is being defended — all commercial shipping, Saudi-linked vessels only, flagged vessels, energy cargoes, or vessels that request help?
What is the geographic boundary — does it extend into the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, which would place Berbera squarely inside it?
Will it stay defensive? The EU's Operation Aspides — situational awareness, escorting, no land strikes — is one workable precedent.
How will it deconflict with Aspides and other existing missions operating in the same waters?
Who actually supplies frigates, patrol aircraft, air defence, satellite intelligence and logistics? A membership list is not a force-generation plan.
By way of comparison, Operation Aspides reported supporting more than 1,960 merchant vessels and protecting more than 650 by May 2026 — a useful benchmark for what a defensive, legitimacy-first mandate can plausibly deliver.
The proposed Houthi tolls: coercion dressed as regulation
Reports that the Houthis may try to charge vessels for transiting Bab al-Mandeb are not simply a revenue play. They represent an attempt to convert military coercion into a permanent claim of maritime governance. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, vessels hold a right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, and bordering states must not hamper that passage; even within territorial seas, charges may only be levied for specific services actually rendered, without discrimination. A non-state armed movement has still less legal standing to monetise passage through an international strait, and the . The toll proposal likely serves three goals at once: financing, political recognition as a maritime authority, and leverage over shipping companies and states. The coalition should resist all three — while distinguishing unlawful passage fees from legitimate, voluntary charges for port, pilotage or salvage services actually rendered.
The recognition question — named plainly
This should not be framed as a trade — port access in exchange for recognition. That framing would undersell both Somaliland's underlying case for statehood and the long-term value of its geography, and it invites the accusation that recognition is being leased through security concessions. What this actually is, said plainly, is a long-game legitimacy strategy, not a short-term exchange. Somaliland has run its own institutions, governed its territory, secured its coast and signed commercial agreements for three decades without a change in its recognition status. Participation in maritime-security architecture will not by itself produce recognition. But sustained, direct, institutionalised cooperation — the kind that makes Riyadh's naval planners routinely pick up the phone to Hargeisa rather than Mogadishu — steadily erodes the working fiction that all engagement with Somaliland must be routed through Somalia. That erosion is the strategy; it is cumulative, not transactional, and Somaliland's messaging should say so rather than imply it. What Somaliland should seek
Six concrete moves, roughly in sequence:
1 Direct dialogue with Riyadh Propose an immediate maritime-security dialogue with the Saudi Ministry of Defence and relevant naval authorities, opening with practical cooperation rather than a maximalist membership demand. The engagement itself establishes the operative principle: arrangements touching Berbera are negotiated with Hargeisa.
2 Associate or observer participation Request associate membership, observer status, or a seat on technical working groups. Any interim formula needs direct Somaliland representation and must not imply Mogadishu holds operational authority over Somaliland's coast — a “without prejudice to recognition” clause can allow cooperation now while preserving Somaliland's position.
3 A Berbera maritime coordination cell Offer to stand up a coordination centre linking the Somaliland coastguard, Berbera Port authorities, DP World, coalition liaison officers and relevant international maritime agencies — covering incident reporting, traffic monitoring, search and rescue, suspicious-vessel alerts, pollution response, and port-security assessments.
4 Port-access and emergency-support arrangements Prepare a transparent framework for naval visits, emergency access, medical evacuation, logistics, force protection, customs and environmental liability — one that preserves Somaliland sovereignty and rules out open-ended foreign military use. Berbera is offered as a maritime-security and logistics partner, not territory for geopolitical rental.
5 Coastguard investment The case is weaker without demonstrated capacity. Priorities: coastal radar coverage, secure communications, patrol-craft maintenance, port-state control, explosive-ordnance preparedness, marine firefighting, search and rescue, and the ability to fuse satellite and AIS data.
6 Strategic coordination with the UAE DP World operates Berbera and the UAE brings serious maritime expertise even without formal coalition membership. Somaliland should encourage Saudi–Emirati coordination over Berbera while avoiding becoming a venue for intra-Gulf rivalry.
Conclusion: maps must follow maritime reality
Saudi Arabia is right that Red Sea security can no longer run on improvised deployments and temporary escorts — the Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb crises have exposed how fragile fragmented responses really are. But a coalition organised around diplomatic convention rather than operational geography will reproduce the very fragmentation it is meant to fix.
Somaliland does not control Bab al-Mandeb. It administers a strategically placed Gulf of Aden coastline, runs the modern port of Berbera, and offers logistical depth east of the chokepoint. Excluding it is not just unfair to Hargeisa — for the reasons set out above, it is a specific, nameable operational gap, not merely a grievance. The coalition's charter is still unwritten. There is time, on both sides, to close that gap before an actual incident forces the question.
A note on currency
Coalition membership, mandate and command details were still emerging as of 31 July 2026 and may have changed by the time this briefing is read; claims sourced to specific outlets are footnoted throughout rather than bundled into a single reading list.